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ABSTRACT: The Household Responsibility System (HRS) has 
improved agricultural productivity and promoted economic 
growth and thus relieved poverty in the rural population of China. 
However, the prevailing assumptions about its nature are that it 
was the result of de-collectivization and privatization (or at least 
semi-privatization) of land and thus an adaptation of capitalism 
or semi-capitalism. Moreover, the property rights structure of the 
HRS in China is also often assumed to be ambiguous and insecure. 
Grasping the principal characteristics of the HRS requires histori-
cal analysis of its origin, development and eventual legislation and 
institutionalization. Marx’s theory of property is the key to under-
standing the institutional change from the Commune System to the 
HRS. It reveals that the HRS is one kind of “individual property” 
that Marx envisioned in post-capitalist society. Antony M. Honoré’s 
theoretical framework of ownership is usefully viewed as a develop-
ment of Marx’s theory; within that framework, the HRS emerges 
as a kind of “split ownership” and its property rights structure can 
be judged to be well-defined.
KEYWORDS: Marx on property, Commune System, Household 
Responsibility System, Chinese agriculture, Honoré
* I am very grateful for the thought-provoking comments and useful criticisms from four 
referees of Science & Society, and to David Laibman for his helpful suggestions and encour-
agement. David McLellan’s consistent support over the past ten years is highly appreciated. 
Emilios Christodoulidis’ high quality four-year supervision was essential in completing this 
paper. I also benefitted from collaboration, comments and/or assistance from Tony Crow, 
Kurt Dopfer, Paddy Ireland, David Kennedy, Noel Peacock, Sean Sayers, Richard Stalley, 
and Pauline Walters.
G4727.indd   300 4/24/2019   3:31:09 PM
 HOUSEHOLD RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM 301
Introduction
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA has seen three major changes to property rights in rural arable land under the lead-ership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The first was 
the extension of the “land to the tiller” program begun by the birth 
of the CCP in the early 1920s. It realized the change from feudal land 
ownership to peasant private property. The second was the abolition 
of peasant private property and the establishment of collective prop-
erty. The consequence was the Commune System of 1956–1978 and 
the establishment of full collective ownership. The third change, in 
1979, was de-collectivization and establishment of the Household 
Responsibility System (HRS), which returned a series of use rights to 
peasant households but preserved the collective possession of land 
and redistributive rights in the hands of the collective (Meng, 2018, 
chs. 4–6).
Since the mid-20th century, discourse on property has been domi-
nated by the dichotomy of “private property” and “public property” 
(Ostrom, 2010). Furthermore, many writers assert that there can be 
only two alternatives: capitalism — private property and free markets 
— or socialism, with public property and central planning (Kornai, 
1992; Demsetz, 2002).
In the context of the transformation of Chinese agriculture, col-
lectivization under the leadership of Mao Zedong and de-collectiviza-
tion in Deng Xiaoping’s era are often conceived of as two opposing 
processes (Xu, 2013). In this view, collectivization is the transition to 
socialism, and de-collectivization is correspondingly the transition to 
capitalism. Therefore, the Commune System is regarded as socialist 
while the HRS is considered capitalist. The transformation has “led 
to the restoration of capitalism, not a new form of market socialism” 
(Hart-Landsberg, 2011, 56). It is ironic that both the left and the 
right have come to a consensus on this transformation (Harvey, 2005; 
Huang, 2008).
From a western point of view, the HRS is simply a compromise 
between the push for privatization and the need to maintain social 
stability in rural areas. China is seen as neither capitalist nor social-
ist but in a half-way house between the true communism of Mao 
and a more humane and sensible acceptance of economic reality 
(Nolan, 1993, 71). Many neoliberals, like Prosterman and Hanstad 
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(1990), applaud the achievements of the HRS (assumed as the result 
of semi-privatization) and criticize it at the same time as not being 
fully privatized. According to their assumption, only private property 
rights are well defined and thus promote economic growth (North, 
1981). The HRS is widely criticized as “ambiguous” (Ho, 2001; Zhu 
and Jiang, 1993).
I contest these views. After a brief description of the recent insti-
tutional change in rural areas, I use Marx’s theory of property as it 
appears in his early manuscripts to analyze the nature of collectivization 
and de-collectivization. I show that collectivization and the Commune 
System had many features similar to the “crude” communism that 
Marx criticized in his early work. The HRS can be conceived of as 
one kind of “individual property” [individuelle Eigentum] that Marx 
envisioned in post-capitalist society in his later work. Then applying 
Honoré’s concept of ownership to re-examine the structure of prop-
erty rights under the HRS, I demonstrate that the HRS is one kind of 
split ownership, and that its property rights structure is well-defined.
A further preliminary point: despite the huge achievement of 
the HRS such as promoting spectacular economic growth (Lin, 1992; 
Naughton, 2007) and leading to a dramatic reduction of poverty in the 
rural population (Chen and Ravallion, 2008), there are new, unsolved 
problems such as the huge gulf of inequality, ecological deteriora-
tion and increasing social conflict in Chinese society. These issues 
are undoubtedly worth investigating. However, in this paper, I will 
focus on the nature of the institutional change from the Commune 
System and the property rights structure of the HRS, rather than the 
complex dynamics of the HRS.
1. THE PROCESS OF MAO’S COLLECTIVIZATION
The completion of land reform abolished feudal land ownership and 
established full peasant private property on the mainland (except 
Tibet) by the end of 1952. Under this system, land was permitted to be 
freely bought and sold. Some peasants in economic difficulties began 
to rent out and even sell off their land allotments, thus becoming, once 
again, landless, while others accumulated more land (Meisner, 1999).
As early as 1950, in order to solve this problem, Gao Gang, the 
leader of the Northeast bureau, proposed a shift from individual 
household farming to collective farming (Teiwes, 1997; Sheng, 2011). 
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Liu Shaoqi, the Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Central Government, 
then the second in command of the CCP, did not agree with Gao’s 
proposal and argued that collectively owned farms would be counter-
productive because of the shortage of farm machinery. Mao approved 
Gao’s idea (Bo, 1991). On April 17, 1951, when the Shanxi provincial 
party committee submitted a report advocating a cooperative “more 
advanced than the current mutual aid team” in the countryside, Liu 
considered it “as [an] erroneous, dangerous, fantastical example of 
agricultural socialist thought” while Mao supported the proposal 
(Yang, 2013, xv; Huang, et al., 1992, 42–4).
Collectivization began on March 26, 1953, when the CCP issued 
a resolution promoting mutual aid teams and the pooling of land for 
agricultural cooperatives. In this historical transformation, closely 
related to the First Five Year Plan, Mao took a gradual and cautious 
approach. It depended on the voluntary support of the peasants and 
calculated that cooperatives would raise both production and income.
There were three stages in the collectivization process. The first 
stage was the organization of Mutual Aid Teams. During this stage, land 
ownership remained the same and exchange of labor was the purpose 
of the cooperative. Members of six or more households, usually based 
on kinship bonds, would still work their lands separately, but would 
help each other during planting and harvest. The Chinese had a long 
tradition of this kind of cooperation. During the War of Resistance 
against Japan, mutual aid and cooperation began to develop strongly 
in former revolutionary-based areas (Schurmann, 1966; Selden, 1971).
The second stage was the introduction of “semi-socialist” or “lower 
agricultural producer cooperatives,” where land would be pooled 
and farmed cooperatively, although each family would retain private 
ownership of some land. Income was distributed partly in accordance 
with labor contributed and partly according to the amount of prop-
erty pooled, including land and capital. During this stage, a coercive 
working style appeared. The choice between joining the coopera-
tives or not came to be seen as following the “socialist” or “capitalist” 
road (Huang, et al., 1992). During this stage, some farmers resisted 
collectivization by slaughtering and eating their animals rather than 
surrendering them (Tanner, 2009; Chen and Lan, 2017).
The third stage was “higher” or “advanced” cooperatives that 
consisted of many of the so-called lower cooperatives. Land, labor 
and capital were held in common and income allocated according 
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to work done. Deng Zihui, then head of the Rural Work Depart-
ment of the CCP, criticized the fundamental issues of collectivization 
(Deng, 2006). At his insistence, in less than two months, the number 
of collectives decreased by 30% (Du, 1985). Mao had criticized both 
Deng Zihui and Zhou Enlai, the premier, for their alleged resistance 
“against rash advance” and their cautious approach (Wu, 1995; Bo, 
1991). With Mao’s promotion, by the end of 1956, 96.3% of peasants 
had joined the cooperatives.
2. THE HOUSEHOLD RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM
The novel feature of the HRS is that it was originally created as a com-
munity institutional arrangement that operated on a small scale to 
generate productive and innovative outcomes. It further developed 
into a national governmental institutional arrangement that operated 
on a large scale to encourage economic growth.
This institutional change was neither purely bottom-up (Kelli-
her, 1992; Zhou, 1996, 2009) nor top-down (Hartford, 1985; Unger, 
1985–1986), but a result of the complex interaction between the com-
munity, officials at multiple local government levels, and the lead-
ers of central government (Oi, 1999; Zweig, 1997). Therefore, it is 
appropriate to borrow the micro-meso-macro approach proposed by 
Dopfer, et al. (2004) as the tool to analyze this change. According to 
Dopfer, et al., from an evolutionary perspective it is not possible to 
move directly from micro into macro. Here, the HRS at the stage of 
community institutional arrangements can be considered as the micro 
domain; the HRS becoming the central governmental form can be 
taken as the macro domain; and the development of the HRS at the 
level of multiple local governments is the meso domain.
The Origin of the HRS
The HRS has its origin in community institutional arrangements. 
On a cold winter night in December 1978, 20 peasants, including two 
cadres of the Xiaogang production team in the poorest Liyuan Com-
mune, in the Fengyang County of Anhui Province, signed a secret 
agreement to make their own rules of production and distribution 
in order to increase agricultural productivity and solve the problem 
of food and clothing shortages.
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We allocate land to each individual household. Every head of the household 
signs their name and seals with their fingerprint on the agreement. If we 
succeed, each household ensures that the whole year state procurement is 
fulfilled and will not ask for money and grain from the government. If it fails, 
we cadres are willing to be put into prison or killed; other members of the 
production team will collectively raise our children until they are eighteen 
years of age. (GB54563, 1983, my translation.)
The authenticity of this document has been questioned but, although 
the original version may have been lost and later copied, the details 
are nonetheless true (Ling, 1997; Wang, 1988).
The official position at that time was that production teams were 
the basic unit of production and accounting; contracting labor with 
individual households was prohibited because it was considered to be 
against the socialist principle of collective farming, although contract-
ing labor with groups was permitted. Household-based production was 
regarded as capitalist, while production team–based production was 
seen as socialist in Mao’s regime. For example, the two agriculture-
related documents issued at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central 
Committee explicitly proclaimed: “No fixing the farm output quo-
tas for each household, no dividing land and laboring individually” 
(quoted in Wu, 2016). The Anhui provincial government reform 
document, the Six Articles, specified “not permitting the contract-
ing of production to individual households and not permitting the 
figuring of compensation according to output” (Wang, et al., 1989, 
385). Meanwhile, Fengyang County was experimenting by contracting 
production to groups. Here, most production teams made choices 
within the existing set of constraints. Initially, the peasants had fol-
lowed the official position. 195 people in the 20 households in the 
entire brigade were split into four task groups, but this was not suc-
cessful; later, they were split into eight groups, but were still unsuc-
cessful. This is when they began discreetly to contract production to 
households (Wu, 1979). In the end, they believed that only by doing 
so would there be motivation to work efficiently.
Thus, the Xiaogang production team made difficult and danger-
ous choices. They decided to put the “bao gan dao hu” (later called the 
HRS by the central government) into effect, using a trial-and-error 
method to establish rules that would increase agricultural produc-
tion. They were engaged in dangerous behavior, risking their lives to 
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create a system that ultimately led to institutional change. The cadres 
were willing to lead this collective action and risked being killed or 
imprisoned, on the condition that other members of the production 
team would raise their children and look after their families. The peas-
ants and cadres were learning norms such as reciprocity to achieve 
successful collective action (Ostrom, 1998). This also highlights “the 
central role of trust in coping with social dilemmas” (Ostrom, 2010, 
642). With trust in each other, they crafted their own production 
and distribution rules. As these were created by peasants at a com-
munity level (Ostrom and Basurto, 2011), the HRS was the peasants’ 
institutional choice (Lin, 1987) and they obtained property rights by 
contracting land, resources and output quotas to individual house-
holds. Through the replacement of the production team system with 
one in which the individual household is the unit of production and 
accounting in rural areas, they gained more autonomy in their labor, 
and more property rights in income distribution. This distributive rule 
was reflected in a jingle in Fengyang: “Comprehensive Contract with 
Household is very clear: Household contract — keep straight on and 
don’t turn back, ensuring the state procurement, reserving enough for 
the collective, and the rest belonging to ourselves!” (Zhang, 2002, 569, 
my translation). This enhanced the link between effort and reward 
because of the income distribution incentive. The changes brought 
hugely improved productivity (Wu, 1979).
Chen Tingyuan, then the first secretary of the CCP in Fengyang 
county, also reported this to his immediate superior, Wang Yuzhao, the 
first secretary of the CCP in Chuxian prefecture who allowed Xiaogang 
village to continue with the experiment for three years as he was a firm 
supporter of rural reform. This was evidenced by the fact that even 
before Wan Li arrived in Anhui, in the spring of 1977, Wang Yuzhao 
had organized 394 cadres to inspect 401 communes and brigades in 
order to re-evaluate the rural policy of “Learning from Dazhai,” the 
model of the commune system under Mao (Wang, et al., 1989).
By October 1977 Wan Li, the first secretary of Anhui province, 
having considered the results of Wang’s rural investigation, led the 
drawing-up of provincial regulations to organize agriculture in Anhui 
(Wu, 2016). These stressed that the autonomy of the production teams 
should be respected, side-line production encouraged and private 
plots restored. It is clear that these policies were an implied criticism 
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of the Dazhai model and intended to undermine Hua, Mao’s succes-
sor (Fewsmith, 1994).
In February 1978, possibly backed by Deng Xiaoping, the details 
of Anhui’s provincial regulations were reported by the People’s Daily 
(Wang, et al., 1989). Wan Li, the first secretary in Anhui province, had 
created a political environment that encouraged local autonomy and 
experiment. The same year, a severe drought hit Anhui that provided 
Wan Li and the province with an opportunity to push radical reform 
(Wang, 1988; Wu, 2016). To give the peasants the chance to survive 
a drought, he lent fallow land to them to cultivate, tax-free, to help 
them overcome the ravages of the drought.
At a provincial agricultural conference, it was Chen himself who 
passed Wu Tingmei’s report to Wan Li (Wang, et al., 1989). Wan was 
extremely interested in this experiment. On January 24, 1980 he and 
other cadres visited Xiaogang. Wan said: 
The prefecture government allows you to contract with households for three 
years; I allow you five years. Only you can contribute more to the state, more 
to the collective, and your lives can improve. . . . It cannot be called the 
reversing of communism into capitalist restoration. (Wang, 1988, 58–59.)
When he was asked whether other places could learn from it, he 
said everyone was permitted to do what was best for the state and the 
peasants, publicly expressing his support for the practice. Thus, it was 
Wan Li’s encouragement that accelerated the change in other parts 
of Anhui province, enabling this small-scale experiment to move to 
the provincial level. Once there was a breakthrough in Xiaogang, oth-
ers quickly began to follow. The role of local governments and their 
leadership should not be underestimated in the process of economic 
reform and change in the countryside (Chung, 1993; 2000).
The Legitimization of the HRS
Thus, the emergence of the HRS was undoubtedly the creation of 
Chinese peasants in Xiaogang village. However, the role of local govern-
ment leaders and even more so, those in central government, should 
not be underestimated. A village in Guizhou Province was found to have 
adopted this practice secretly more than ten years before the recent 
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reform. However, the villagers did not admit it until the new policy was 
announced (Du, 1985). After Deng Xiaoping once again took a lead-
ership position, he rethought the essence of socialism and said of his 
rivals: “they are not clear about what capitalism is and what socialism 
is” (Deng, 1993, 227). This was also reflected in his speech discussing 
Marxist theory on June 30, 1984 at a Central Committee plenum: “What 
is socialism and what is Marxism? We were not quite clear about this 
in the past. Marxism attaches utmost importance to developing the 
productive forces” (Deng, 1984a). This contrasts with Mao’s ideology. 
Mao had repeatedly argued that de-collectivization equaled capitalist 
transition. As early as 1962, for example, he asked, “Do we want social-
ism or capitalism? Do we want collectivization or de-collectivization?” 
(cf. Pang and Jin, 2003, ch. 30). Mao’s prescriptive policy was to main-
tain the class struggle (Xu, 2013; 2014). In the early 1960s, facing the 
disaster of the Great Leap Forward, most of the central leaders had 
supported de-collectivization (Teiwes, 1997, 266). Deng also made the 
famous claim that it did not matter what method was used (“yellow or 
black cat”) as long as it worked (“caught the mouse”) (Deng, 1994), 
but Deng and others had been labeled by Mao as “capitalist roaders” 
in the Cultural Revolution (Chan, 1979; Wei, 2011).
An analytical comparison between the consequences of two alter-
native institutional arrangements for land tenure provides a better 
understanding of the nature of China’s rural transformation. The 
Commune System had resulted in long-term economic stagnation and 
decline. “On the eve of reform in 1978, the whole country had a rural 
population of 250 million in half starvation mode” (Wu, 2016, xxvii). 
At that time, 80% of the Chinese population lived in the countryside 
and Deng was aware of the importance of rural development and 
improvement in people’s lives to the whole Chinese economy: “If the 
peasants did not shake off poverty, China would remain poor” (1993, 
237). After Mao’s death, Deng was willing to undertake institutional 
change and was in a highly influential position.
In March 1980, Wan reported on rural reform in Anhui province 
to Deng (Wu, 2016). This was a key discussion regarding household-
based production and, at a meeting of the National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee in April 1980, Zhao Ziyang and Wan Li were 
named as vice premiers of the State Council. More significantly, in a 
victory that marked a personal triumph, Wan replaced his rival, Wang 
Renzhong, as head of the State Agricultural Commission. Thus, Wan 
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Li, a man who recognized the issues in the land system, was able to 
initiate more radical change (Fewsmith, 1994).
In May 1980, after he obtained more information on its economic 
viability and political acceptability, Deng (1984b, 275) expressed his 
support for the HRS to two of his most prominent opponents, Deng 
Liquan and Hu Qiaomu. Not only did Deng strongly approve of 
the peasants’ creativity in Anhui’s Feixi and Fengyang counties; he 
also reassured the public that there were no concerns regarding the 
HRS: “Generally speaking, the main obstacle in dealing with current 
problems in the countryside is an insufficient amount of ideological 
freedom” (Deng, 1984b, 275), referring to Mao’s view of household-
based production. Deng’s speech was circulated among the central 
leaders. This was the most important support ever given to the HRS, 
and made it possible for the HRS to develop from local experiments 
to national policy (Heilmann, 2008).
3. APPLYING MARX’S THEORY OF PROPERTY TO 
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATIONS
The Commune System and Crude Communism
Mao’s collectivization and its disastrous consequences were attrib-
uted to Marx’s idea of communism (Ellickson, 1993). This is clearly 
wrong. Mao’s collectivization is not Marx’s idea of genuine commu-
nism but the very “crude” communism that Marx criticized. Marx 
criticizes the form of property in “crude” communism as “the positive 
expression of the abolition of private property” and thus it is still in 
essence a kind of “universal private property.” Marx makes two criti-
cisms of “crude” communism. These are applicable to Mao’s collec-
tivization and the Commune System.
The first criticism is that the form of property in “crude” com-
munism is “only a generalization and completion of that relation (of 
private property)” (Marx, 1975, 346). During the Great Leap Forward 
(1958–60), Mao put forward the slogan “The People’s Communes 
are good” and characterized them by the phrase “big and collective.” 
All private property was abolished. Peasants said: “All we’ve been 
allowed to keep is one pair of chopsticks and one bowl,” and, “all 
we own is the clothes on our backs and the food that remains in our 
stomachs . . . we do not even own ourselves.” The cadres responded: 
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“Communism means eliminating all private property” (Huang, 
et al., 1992). This is one form of crude communism: “The domina-
tion of material property bulks so large that it threatens to destroy 
everything which is not capable of being possessed by everyone as 
private property” (Marx, 1975, 346). During the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Mao’s policies, such as shutting 
down the nation’s schools and ending higher education, confirm 
Marx’s insight that “it wants to abstract from talent, etc., by force” 
(Marx, 1975, 346). It is not surprising that there were issues such as 
labor monitoring, shirking and the problem of “free riders” similar 
to those that appear in the capitalist system (Edney, 1979; Grossman 
and Hart, 1980) with some workers feeling that they were working 
hard while others were idle and yet gained the same rewards. This 
was the experience of egalitarian experiments in China under the 
Commune System (Lin, 1988; Putterman, 1991; Dong and Dow, 
1993). The system of equal pay according to time without regard 
to level of performance was called the “iron rice bowl” (because 
it was always a uniform size). It created resentment and a sense of 
unfairness. As Sayers (2011, 122) notes, this led to “a decrease in 
productivity that is detrimental to all.”
Under the Commune System, the peasants were paid by “work 
points.” Thus the collective became the “universal capitalist” and the 
peasants became the “wage laborer.” As Marx says: “The community 
is only a community of labor, and equality of wages paid out by com-
munal capital — by the community as the universal capitalist” (Marx, 
1975, 346–347). There was an upward movement in ownership, i.e., 
in order to eliminate unequal land and resource ownership, the so-
called bourgeois rights, one must begin by collectivizing land from 
lower levels of collectives (e.g., production teams) to higher levels (e.g., 
brigades and communes) until the level of ownership by all the people 
is reached (Beijing Review, 1977; Khan, 1983). This helped unleash 
the “Communist Wind” and hurt the higher (richer) teams’ interests 
(Peking Review, 1966; Yang, 2013, ch. 7). This was the “level down” of 
extreme egalitarianism that Mao advocated (Mao, 1977). However, 
Marx wrote: “The thought of every piece of private property as such 
is at least turned against wealthier private property in the form of envy 
and the urge to reduce things to a common level, so that this envy 
and urge even constitute the essence of competition” (Marx, 1975, 
346). “Crude communism [the manuscript has: Kommunist] is only the 
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culmination of this envy and of this leveling-down proceeding from 
the preconceived minimum” (ibid.). For Marx, this communism does 
not provide understanding of the “human nature of need.” It envis-
ages a simple ascetic community which negates wealth and enforces 
“leveling down.” It abstractly negates “the entire world of culture and 
civilization,” and seeks to “return to the unnatural simplicity of the 
poor, unrefined man who has no needs” (Marx, 1975, 346; cf. Sayers, 
2011, 102–105). In Marx’s view, this was “merely a manifestation of the 
vileness of private property, which wants to set itself up as the positive 
community system” (Marx, 1975, 347). This kind of communism indeed 
had “a definite, limited standard” (ibid.). The form of property in the 
idea of “crude” communism is in essence “universal private property.” 
It does not truly overcome individual private property.
Marx also has a second criticism of “crude communism”: by taking 
private property into common ownership, it achieves only a partial 
and abstract negation of it. Crude communism “has not yet compre-
hended the positive essence of private property” and hence “it is still 
held captive and contaminated by private property” (Marx, 1975, 
348). Here Marx distinguishes the positive aspect of private property 
from its negative side. The idea that there is such a thing as a “positive 
essence” of private property is indeed itself striking (Sayers, 2011, 108). 
Marx is profoundly critical of private property, in particular capitalist 
private property and its impact. As he explicitly states, the ultimate 
goal of his communism is to abolish private property in the means of 
production. Marx’s views on this theme are well known. However, this 
does not mean that Marx does not maintain that there is a positive 
aspect to private property and the social and economic development 
it has brought about.
Marx is a thorough and profound thinker. He has a serious and 
critical attitude to private property. In investigating private property 
and its impact, Marx makes several important distinctions, from vari-
ous theoretical perspectives. These distinctions provide indispensable 
keys to understanding Marx’s view of private property. One is the 
distinction between its positive and negative aspects. Ellickson says 
that Marx has been “unpardonably hostile” to “the notion of private 
property in land” (1993, 1397). This is clearly wrong. For Marx, pri-
vate property is not the simple moral notion that it is often said to 
be. On the contrary, private property is a historical phenomenon. His 
concept is to understand its nature and its development, not merely 
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to condemn it; he takes a historical and dialectical approach. Any 
adequate and valid account of his view must register both sides of the 
case, the positive as well as the negative.
Another key point is the distinction between the private property 
of laborers and the private property of non-laborers. Marx writes: 
“Political economy confuses, on principle, two different kinds of pri-
vate property, one of which rests on the labor of the producer him-
self, and the other on the exploitation of the labor of others” (Marx, 
1976, 931). By restricting their arguments for the positive aspects of 
private property, capitalist thinkers such as Locke and Ricardo end 
up reproducing an apparent dualism between the economic and the 
juridical concepts of private property (Marx, 1976, 1083–1084). Marx 
insists that there is a fundamental distinction between laborers’ private 
property based on the owner’s own labor and private property based 
on exploitation of others, and thus he has different attitudes to these 
different kinds of private property. Avineri suggests that Marx advo-
cates “the abolition of all property relations as such” (1968, 109). This 
is wrong too. Marx did not advocate abolishing all private property. 
His communism is “not the abolition of property generally, but the 
abolition of bourgeois property” (Marx and Engels, 1978, 484; cf. Say-
ers, 2011, 101). Capitalist private property is only one kind of private 
property (Laibman, 2007). When Marx’s meaning of the abolition of 
private property is restored to its proper context and interpreted in 
this light, it becomes evident that Marx’s communism seeks to abolish 
one particular form rather than private property in general. Marx did 
not argue for the abolition of private property earned by the labor of 
the producer himself.
The HRS and Marx’s Idea of “Individual Property”
Marx saw a positive aspect in private property, including capital-
ist private property, from the perspective of historical development. 
Considerable development has occurred within the social framework 
of private property. However, the communist society that will even-
tually come, Marx believed, will not redistribute private property to 
the producers, even though there may be positive aspects to private 
property, as is suggested by those who advocate welfare measures to 
ameliorate the impact of capitalist private property. As he explicitly 
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states, his communism “does not re-establish private property” (Marx, 
1976, 931).
However, he maintains that true communism should not simply 
negate and destroy this development; rather it must build upon it 
and transform it. Capitalist private property should not be repudiated 
absolutely, or in an “abstract” way. Rather, its alienated form must be 
overcome and its positive aspects appropriated in a non-alienated 
fashion. The ideal form of property he calls individual property [indi-
viduelle Eigentum] (Marx, 1976 [1867], 929; Marx, 1958, 414). This 
term has provoked an enormous flood of controversy and criticism 
(Arthur, 2002, 124, 126; Engels, 1962, 180; Sayers, 2011, 115–117), 
and poses genuine problems of interpretation. Dühring writes: “Herr 
Marx remains cheerfully in the nebulous world of his property which 
is at once both individual and social and leaves it to his adepts to solve 
for themselves this profound dialectical enigma” (quoted in Engels, 
1962 [1877], chapter XIII).
Here, Dühring mocked Marx’s use of Hegel’s dialectical approach. 
Marx is quite explicit about his debt to Hegel in this respect and 
calls himself “the pupil of that mighty thinker” (Marx, 1976 [1873], 
102–103). One of the main principles that Marx inherits from Hegel 
is the historical and dialectical approach. It is in the light of this that 
the concept of individual property must be understood. Marx says that 
“individual property” is the “negation of the negation.” The result of 
the first negation is capitalist private property. “The capitalist mode 
of appropriation, which springs from the capitalist mode of produc-
tion, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of 
individual private property, as founded on the labor of its proprietor” 
(Marx, 1976 [1961], 929). “The latter” is “the direct antithesis of the 
former” and “grows on the former’s tomb and nowhere else” (ibid., 
931). The result of the second negation is “individual property.” Marx’s 
communism “does indeed establish individual property on the basis 
of the achievement of the capitalist era: namely co-operation and 
the possession in common of the land and the means of production 
produced by labor itself” (ibid., 931).
Even here, Marx does not set out his philosophical assumptions 
on “individual property” at length. For an understanding of these one 
must turn to Hegel. The negation of the negation is a process. It is 
not a bare negation, but takes the form of a dialectical supersession 
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in which the conditions of the original thing are not only transcended 
and negated, but also preserved and built upon for a positive result. 
As Hegel says: “The negative which emerges as a result of dialectic, is, 
because a result, at the same time the positive: it contains what it results 
from, absorbed into itself, and made part of its own nature” (Hegel, 
1892, §81Z, 152). Hegel uses the word “aufheben” to describe this sort 
of development. This term has been variously translated into English 
as “supersede,” “transcend,” or “sublate,” but none of these adequately 
captures the German meaning. According to Hegel (1969, 107), “to 
sublate (aufheben) has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one 
hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it means to put 
an end to. . . . Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved.”
The HRS is one form of individual property, as understood by 
Marx, in that it has also experienced this kind of dialectical develop-
ment. Collective property, which derives from the collective mode of 
production, negated peasant private property. This is the first nega-
tion of peasants’ private property. It did not preserve and maintain 
the positive aspect of peasant private property as it lacked incentives 
and discouraged initiative. However, it did forbid exploitation and dif-
ferentials and established the collective as “universal capitalist.” How-
ever, collective production begets, with the inexorability of a natural 
process, its own negation. This is the negation of the negation. It does 
not re-establish peasant private property, but it does indeed establish 
individual property on the basis of the achievement of the collective: 
namely co-operation and the possession in common of the land and 
the means of production by labor itself. This “possession in com-
mon” is social property, while the individual family use is individual 
property in that the direct producer re-controls his production and 
the fruit of his labor. This is the key to understanding Marx’s mean-
ing of “individual.” The social aspect of the HRS is that the land has 
been brought under collective and conscious control for public good 
rather than being used to exploit labor under feudal land ownership 
or to maximize profits for a few. Thus, the HRS, as the result of “the 
negation of negation,” can be conceived of as one kind of “individual 
property” that Marx envisages. Therefore, the emergence of the HRS 
is more in keeping with Marx’s view. We should also take a histori-
cal and dialectical approach to the HRS. Both the “individual” and 
the “social” aspects” will change with the further development of the 
productive forces.
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4. THE RELEVANCE OF HONORÉ’S CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK OF OWNERSHIP
Since Marx, the concept of property has gradually changed from the 
Blackstonian concept of “sole and despotic dominion” over tangible 
things into property being a “bundle of property rights.” In the 1960s, 
the British legal theorist A. M. Honoré adopted a similar approach to 
analyzing the concept of “ownership” and disaggregated it into eleven 
“standard incidents of ownership,” bound together in a state of “full” 
liberal individual ownership or “split ownership” (1961). Arguably, 
Honoré’s concept of ownership is particularly relevant to Marx’s idea 
of individual property. Of course, there is an important difference in 
their political views. Marx is a revolutionary. His concept of property 
provides the leading theoretical principle for the Chinese leaders in 
their revolution and construction of socialism. Honoré is a progres-
sive liberal legal theorist. It is important to recognize the different 
perspectives of Marx and Honoré when applying them to the HRS.
However, Marx and Honoré can be compared and contrasted in 
their view of what is essential to property. Marx analyzes property as 
social relationships, specifically as historical relationships of produc-
tion (see, e.g., Marx, 1976, 932). Honoré also conceives of property 
as social relationships (1961). On this point, he shares a fundamental 
common ground with Marx.
Of course, Marx is also familiar with both the full liberal concept 
of ownership and that of the split ownership which informs the theo-
ries of Honoré. The joint stock company and the “dissolution of the 
atom of property” is a key example (Marx, 1971, 435–441; cf. Ireland 
and Meng, 2017). The division of surplus value among the different 
exploiters is another example (Marx, 1976, 709–710). Marx uses a 
framework of split ownership similar to that of joint stock companies 
to envisage a form of property that reconciles the individual and 
social aspects of property to supersede capitalist private property. 
Thus, Marx’s concept of “individual property” is a result and expres-
sion of various cases of split ownership that were current in his time. 
His ideal form of property is a kind of split ownership that combines 
notions of “individual property” with notions of “socialized property.”
Honoré analyses extensively this kind of institutional form and 
shows that the various “sticks in the bundle” can not only be shortened 
and restricted, but also split and allocated to different persons. Some of 
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these “persons” might be individual human beings and some of them 
collective or corporate bodies. In this sense, therefore, it is perfectly 
possible to create “individual property” alongside “socialized prop-
erty”; and to create individual property rights within a broadly social 
or collectivist property framework. Knowledge of Honoré’s concept of 
ownership helps to clarify the content of Marx’s concept of individual 
property that he himself does not make explicit — in particular, how 
this form of property remained “individual” and in what sense it was 
“social.” Even Marxist scholars such as C. J. Arthur were surprised, if not 
perplexed, by Marx’s idea of “individual property” (Arthur, 2002, 124). 
Arguably, this can be considered as one kind of split ownership in which 
some property rights are in the hands of individuals and others are in 
the hands of society. Thus, applying Honoré’s theoretical framework to 
the HRS is also useful in giving Marx’s concept of individual property 
a detailed and experiential content. To summarize, Marx’s theory of 
property and Honoré’s concept of ownership are compatible in key 
respects, although no attempt has been made here to assimilate Marx’s 
theory of property into the later “bundle of rights” theories.
5. APPLYING HONORÉ’S IDEA OF SPLIT OWNERSHIP TO 
THE PROPERTY RIGHTS STRUCTURE OF THE HRS
In Honoré’s words, the tension between the “individual” aspect and the 
“social” aspect is the issue of “how far private ownership should stretch 
and to what extent it should be modified in the public interest” (1961, 
107). The HRS is a clear case of split ownership in which 11 standard 
incidents are divided between the peasant’s household, the collective 
and the state. The peasant household’s rights to use, manage, receive 
income, etc., fall on the “individual” side of Marx’s dichotomy; while the 
collective’s right to possess, its power of redistribution, residual rights, 
and so on, as well as the state’s withdrawal of the rights of alienation 
and mortgage, are key social aspects of property, according to Marx. 
For Honoré, the former belongs to the category of “private ownership,” 
and the latter two are in the scope of “public interests.”
The Collective
There are five incidents entitled to remain in the hands of the 
collective. These constitute the power of the collective in managing 
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the problem of landlessness and the imbalance in land distribution 
resulting from demographic changes. It is in this collective aspect that 
the land has been brought under collective control and organized 
for the peasants’ common good, rather than for the exploitation of 
labor and the maximization of private profit.
The Right to Possess
Under the HRS, as in the Commune System, it is still the col-
lective that has “exclusive physical control” of land. Article 10 of the 
1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China states: “Land in 
the rural and suburban areas is owned by collectives except for those 
portions which belong to the State as prescribed by law; house sites 
and privately farmed plots of cropland and hilly land are also owned 
by collectives.” This principle was upheld in the subsequent various 
amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 
(1988; 1993; 1999; 2004). Correspondingly, the Chinese legal system 
provides some rules and procedures to protect the right of collectives 
to possess arable land.
The Right to Security
The collective, as the owner of rural arable land, has the right to 
security. However, for Honoré, any right to security is not absolute. 
In contrast to the view that “ownership” is “absolute,” a view that is 
used to “emphasize its exemption from social control,” he insists that 
“ownership has never been absolute”: “Even in the most individual-
istic ages of Rome and the United States, it has had a social aspect” 
(ibid., 145–146). One of these incidents of ownership is liability to 
“expropriation by the public authority” (ibid., 146). Similarly, owners 
of houses or land in Britain can be obliged to sell to local or central 
government if required for highways or other infrastructure. This is 
known as “compulsory purchase.”
Honoré insists on the distinction between “expropriation” and 
“wrongful conversion” (ibid., 120). This is important in viewing the 
expropriation of land by local government in contemporary China. 
One difficult task for the central government is how to protect the 
rights of farmers and ensure that they receive a fair share of profits 
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from the conversion of land to industrial and residential use (Zheng, 
2011).
The Incident of Transmissibility
The collective as a whole goes beyond the individual and the land 
is “eternal.” Therefore, the collective enjoys “unlimited duration”: the 
collective land can be transmitted to the next generation’s successors 
and so on ad infinitum and it is not permissible to determine (i.e., 
terminate) at a future date.
The Incident of Absence of Term
Since the collective as a whole can survive from generation to gen-
eration, it is to continue in the enjoyment of ownership in perpetuity. 
Therefore, the collective interests of ownership are provided by the 
Chinese legal system as indeterminate. On the other hand, with state 
expropriation, the collective may lose an interest in the land. Then 
this kind of indeterminate interest becomes actually a determinable 
interest.
Residuary Character
Because a legal system might recognize interests in matters other 
than ownership, there is a “characteristic of ownership” that “an owner 
has a residuary right in the thing owned” (Honoré, 1961, 127–128). 
The Chinese legal system recognizes interests in such matters. The 
contract period in rural land is usually 30 years. On the determina-
tion of such interests, the rights in question can be exercised by the 
collective, which has the ultimate residuary right; this right, however, 
is not coupled with alienability or liability to execution. In the context 
of the Chinese rural land system under the HRS, it is safe to say that 
the collective has a residuary character.
The system also allows the subleasing of rural land. Within the 
30-year contract period, on the termination of a sub-lease, the rights 
in question become exercisable by the lessee — the peasant house-
hold, not the “owner” (the collective). When the sub-lessee’s interest 
terminates, the lessee acquires the corresponding rights; but when the 
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lessee’s rights terminate, the “owner” acquires these rights. Therefore, 
the collective is “the ultimate residuary.”
The Peasants
The Right to Use. On a narrow interpretation, “use” refers to the 
owner’s personal use and enjoyment of the thing owned (ibid., 117). 
This incident “has rightly been recognized as a cardinal feature of 
ownership” (ibid.). Chinese peasants acquired this right to use at the 
beginning of institutional innovation. By this right, they obtained 
autonomy in agricultural production.
The Right to Manage. Subletting had been considered as an 
“impure” element of socialism and had thus been forbidden; gradu-
ally, however, the peasants obtained “use” in a wider sense, including 
management and income. The right to use has been substantially 
enlarged (Mullan, et al., 2011), and the right to management means 
that peasants have the power to subcontract. For those less fortunate, 
such as widows and the elderly, by subletting their land to others, 
they could obtain an income and avoid complete poverty and destitu-
tion; subletting in most cases is thus mutually beneficial (Zhang and 
Donaldson, 2013). As for subletting for agri-business, the situation 
is more complex.
The Right to Income. Before the 2006 abolition of agricultural taxes 
and fees, peasants had the right to manage their income, so long as 
they paid the procurement of the state and the collective. After 2006, 
the occupation of land can be “regarded as the simplest way of deriv-
ing an income from it, of enjoying it” (Honoré, 1961, 118).
The Duration of Contracts for Peasants. The gradual increase in dura-
tion from three-to-five years through to 15-to-30 years within the HRS 
confirms Honoré’s assertion that this incident can be stretched or 
shortened. The Land Administration Law of 1999 and other subse-
quent laws provide a 30-year lease period. Within that period, a peas-
ant can pass the inherent right to her/his successor when s/he dies. 
Therefore, the peasant partially obtains the incident of transmissibility. 
However, the collective also has the right to adjust land allocation in 
response to changes of demography, under strict conditions.
The Prohibition of Harmful Use. Chinese law requires that rural 
land be used “rationally.” Article 10 of the Revised 2004 Constitution 
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stipulates that “all organizations and individuals using land must 
ensure its rational use.” Letting land lie fallow is not allowed in that 
it has the same effect as the harmful use of land (Xu and Zhang, 1993).
The State
The Right to Capital. This incident is withdrawn from both the col-
lective and the individual peasant household, in that neither can buy 
or sell the land. In this way, the government avoids the re-emergence 
of a landlord class. As we have seen, this is the incident that the neo-
liberals cherish, but it confirms Honoré’s insight: “In nearly all systems 
there will be something to which not all the standard incidents apply, 
some things which cannot be sold or left by will” (1961, 110).
Liability to Execution. This incident is by no means a “right” but a 
liability. For the owner, it is a limitation on ownership imposed in the 
social interest. However, this incident has played an important role 
in the growth of credit (Honoré, 1961, 124).
This standard ingredient was also withdrawn by the Chinese state 
from both the collective and the peasants, which seems to be incon-
sistent with the liberal idea of ownership. This has been criticized 
on many grounds, such as the limits it imposes on peasants’ access 
to institutional credit, especially to medium- and long-term loans 
(Feder, et al., 1990; 1992; Sargeson, 2012; Hodgson and Huang, 2013).
Neoliberal thinkers ignore the negative aspect of this incident 
in that “the foreclosure of a peasant’s mortgaged land” would bring 
“involuntary unemployment and rural destitution” (Dong, 1996, 921). 
Furthermore, such a resulting state of affairs “would only exacerbate 
class inequality and social tensions in rural China, and further weaken 
farmers’ positions in dealing with more powerful actors” (Zhang and 
Donaldson, 2013, 255). For the peasant, land is a basic form of social 
security (Guo, 2003; Zhang, et al., 2001).
6. CONCLUSION
Mao’s collectivization, along with his Great Leap Forward and the Cul-
tural Revolution, was carried out in the name of Marxism. Its purpose 
was to improve agricultural production through achieving economies of 
scale in production, increase peasants’ income and pursuit of common 
prosperity through eliminating exploitation and bourgeois rights. The 
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unintended consequence was starvation, long-term economic stagna-
tion and universal poverty in the rural population. This is not Marx’s 
communism but the crude communism that Marx targeted in his early 
work. De-collectivization was a complex interaction between peasants, 
local officials and central leaders, concerning how to construct a rela-
tively harmonious relationship between the collective, the state and 
the peasants. The HRS is the transcendental dialectic of the Commune 
System. Clearly, the HRS can be conceived of as one kind of the many 
forms of “individual property” that Marx had envisaged.
Honoré’s concept of split ownership provides an illuminating 
framework to understand in what sense Marx’s “individual property” 
remains both “individual” and “social.” Applying Honoré’s ideas of 
split ownership to the Chinese experience not only confirms Marx’s 
insight; it also provides an empirical and economic content to Marx’s 
sketchy and vague account of the ideal form of property in post-capitalist 
society. Meanwhile, it refutes the assertion that the HRS is ambiguous 
and ill-defined. Honoré’s concept of split ownership is also helpful in 
understanding the property rights structure of the HRS. In terms of his 
idea of split ownership, the HRS is relatively sophisticated in its manner 
of harmonizing and reconciling the interests of the state, the collective 
and the peasants, as well as careful coordination of the private interests 
of the peasants and social aspects of property in rural land. The HRS 
is one kind of Honoré’s “split ownership” which can become an ideal 
form of property. It is well developed, and thus encourages economic 
growth and the reduction of poverty. It is a viable and real alternative 
to both full collective ownership under the People’s Commune model 
and the full individual peasant ownership that the neoliberals advocate.
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